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NATO’S SELECTIVE SEA BLINDNESS
Assessing the Alliance’s New Navies
Thomas-Durell Young
 Governments of the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are guilty of inattention to, and sea blindness in, modernizing their 
navies� While among “old” NATO navies this reality is understood and docu-
mented widely, the state of development and readiness of those navies considered 
“new” receives considerably less attention�1 On examination, these new navies are 
deficient in building integrated capabilities, ensuring common operating proce-
dures, projecting battlespace awareness, and accomplishing interoperability in all 
maritime combat domains�
This is because of a combination of three factors: the tyranny of Mackinder-
esque geography; the legacies of the former communist countries that inform 
how forces man, equip, and train for war; and Western governments’ inability 
when proffering advice and assistance to understand fully the operational and 
cultural contexts within which the new navies exist� To date, a focused analysis is 
lacking, not only of the status of development of these navies, but, perhaps even 
more importantly, of the common challenges they face as they modernize their 
respective fleets� This lack of an across-the-board analysis is not necessarily ob-
vious, given the disparities in size of these navies and their different geographic 
locations—the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas, none of which are contiguous� 
However, this lack of attention is no longer prudent in light of Russia’s seizure 
of Crimea and its policy of challenging the post–Cold War international order� 
Those states with shores on the Black and Baltic Seas now find themselves on the 
front line with, or indeed adjacent to, an aggressive Russia� Arguably, because we 
lack a clear conceptual framework, we are hindered in our full understanding 
of those endogenous influences that continue to obstruct the modernization of 
these postcommunist navies�
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This article builds a foundation of understanding that provides a clearer analy-
sis of the many challenges facing new navies in their modernization efforts and 
provides an explanation for these navies’ limited operational capabilities� More 
importantly, it identifies those influences that are inhibiting them from adopting 
the basic and relevant tenets of Western defense and naval concepts�2 This is not 
to imply that these navies should adopt a Western, blue-water rationale; rather, 
there is an overwhelming need for them more systematically to adopt Western-
style mission command and combat readiness, as well as operational and tacti-
cal leadership—practices that support the development of reliable, lethal naval 
capabilities to deter Russian revanchist activities� To achieve this objective, it is 
necessary that they more closely align themselves with Western defense gover-
nance norms and adopt a stronger operational focus through more training and 
exercises and, consequently, more sea time for their forces� Yet, as the author 
argues elsewhere, communist concepts are quite difficult to eradicate even after 
legacy kit is retired and replaced by Western weaponry�3 Thus, a clearer apprecia-
tion of the conceptual and institutional challenges faced by these navies, as well 
as instances where they have been able to overcome them, is applicable within 
central and eastern Europe and beyond�
In its examination of NATO’s new navies, the article addresses four core ar-
eas� First, the best means to assess these navies is through the small-navy school 
of thought—notwithstanding the ostensibly large size of the Polish navy, if one 
counts hulls� An examination of the characteristics of this typology provides 
a clearer understanding of the inherent challenges and operational limitations 
under which these navies must function� Second, on this foundation the article 
describes and analyzes the communist-era legacy institutional and conceptual 
impediments to reform and modernization� That the Baltic States’ navies were 
created from scratch implies that Soviet naval legacies are modest at best; how-
ever, their larger national defense institutions, as in other legacy countries, con-
tinue to harbor atavistic inheritances in their concepts, assumptions, and, indeed, 
institutional logic� Third, the article assesses these navies within the context of 
a resurgent Russia, with its offensive capabilities in the Baltic and Black Seas, 
along with the different challenges that exist in the Adriatic Sea� These chal-
lenges include the current underperforming state of their fleets, the lack of or 
insufficiency of modernization plans, and the policies and planning assumptions 
that are inhibiting them from achieving greater levels of operational capability� 
Fourth, the article assesses the policies, planning assumptions, and programs that 
Western nations and their navies have employed in assisting these new navies to 
modernize and become more lethal, then identifies how such advice and assis-
tance can improve�
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UNDERSTANDING SMALL NAVIES
The small-navy model provides the greatest explanatory power for assessing the 
forces and policies of the navies in the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas� Although 
the model was developed relatively recently, a modest body of useful literature 
has emerged that addresses the characteristics and challenges facing small navies� 
To give an appreciation of the challenges unique to small navies, Till notes that 
a small navy is one with “limited means and aspirations�” He adds additional 
limitations of small navies: “geographic range, function and capability, access 
to high-grade technology, and reputation�”4 Likewise, Germond observes that 
navies can be categorized using the criteria of their reach and projection capa-
bilities�5 Lacking economies of scale (in terms of numbers of platforms), small 
navies with limited numbers of hulls are likely to be disproportionally subject 
to the realities of the iron laws of required refits, which could keep them from 
conducting continuous and cost-effective operations at sea� This complicates op-
erational planning and training, because their availability and readiness rates are 
lower than those of larger navies� At the policy level, the fleets’ small sizes render 
them vulnerable to budget cuts, and this further exacerbates their challenge of 
maintaining operational readiness� In small organizations with correspondingly 
modest personnel numbers, commanders must understand how to exploit lim-
ited opportunities for gaining professional experience at sea and in challenging 
postings� Gaining experience and command at sea—essential to developing and 
growing commanders—is complicated in smaller ships because they have limited 
endurance and therefore spend less time at sea than larger, blue-water vessels�6 
These generic small-navy realities complicate such services’ ability to produce 
leaders who have the credibility to give advice at the national level on what naval 
forces are capable of providing�7
Because small navies cannot achieve the economies of scale that midsize and 
larger navies enjoy, officials must command these forces effectively to provide 
maritime-defense capabilities� For successful recruitment and retention of sail-
ors, small navies must implement effective personnel-management policies to 
create a sustainable career structure that includes a healthy balance between ship 
and shore postings�8 Adding to the personnel-management challenges, small 
navies often must put self-reliant ships to sea—those that operate alone instead 
of within integrated squadrons� Given these stark realities, small navies, depend-
ing on defense policy priorities, often rely on multinational cooperation, develop 
niche capabilities, accept limited operational roles, and accept compromises in 
designs and performance of their ships� With this background in mind, one can 
appreciate better the realities that NATO’s new navies face� All the navies assessed 
in this article can be considered small navies; however, there are moves afoot in 
NWC_Summer2019Review.indb   15 5/2/19   11:35 AM
3
Young: NATO’s Selective Sea Blindness—Assessing the Alliance’s New Navie
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 1 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Poland that could break the Polish navy out of this classification and expand its 
reach and power projection by increasing the size and capabilities of the fleet�9
CONCEPTUAL IMPEDIMENTS TO REFORM  
AND MODERNIZATION
The continued employment of legacy forces is a key impediment to small navies’ 
adoption of Western naval concepts� Their entire approach to naval architecture, 
weapons, training, and even crew space is vastly different from that characteristic 
of Western concepts�10 Yet it is not only maintaining legacy platforms that has 
slowed the adoption of the Western approach to naval warfare� In these countries, 
all armed forces are built on a family of military concepts that in the case of com-
munist military doctrine were quite coherent and highly integrated�11
Addressing the issue of legacy communist concepts is a twofold problem� First, 
in the rare instance where officials have attempted to retire legacy doctrine, its 
supporting concepts have proved quite resilient� Second, to date, Western of-
ficials and knowledgeable analysts have not acknowledged that the principles’ 
continued use (conscious or otherwise) in an organization presents a major 
impediment to adopting Western defense and military concepts�12 It is essential 
to understand that communist and Western military and naval concepts are an-
tithetical, and therefore incapable of coexistence in the same institution�
Because of their coherence, these legacy concepts remain entrenched firmly 
in practice, in law, and even within organizational sociology� Furthermore, as 
related to navies, these legacy practices have impeded the adoption of Western 
defense and military concepts because the former were designed to ensure that 
senior officers were not permitted to make independent decisions at the tactical 
level� In Western navies, commanders expect their subordinates to use critical 
thinking and their own initiative to solve problems, while in many legacy navies 
commanders are expected only to execute orders and never to take the initia-
tive�13 To a degree almost inconceivable to the Western mind, former communist 
defense institutions not only undermined the ability of commanders to exercise 
command but also centralized decision-making power in ministries of defense, 
both of which all but ensured that the armed forces would struggle to grow com-
manders, in comparison with Western culture�14
While it is true that these legacy concepts continue to exist throughout central 
and eastern Europe, their intensity varies among defense institutions and navies� 
It is instructive to identify key legacy concepts that continue to influence govern-
ments� These include the following:15
1� Policy, as it is understood in the West, often is not accepted in the region 
and many times is confused with politika (partisan politics)� It is rare 
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that a defense institution has been able to formulate even modest policy 
frameworks to express government guidance and priorities and develop 
plans to execute them� Where policy documents do exist, they typically 
are meaningless because it is rarer still that priorities are expressed at 
all, let alone their financial costs (neither short-term nor life-cycle)� 
The observation to political, defense, and military officials in the region 
that in a democracy, policy is money is met all too often with a blank, 
uncomprehending stare�
2� Highly centralized decision-making, often occurring well above the level 
of chiefs of services and even chiefs of defense, is employed for even 
the most mundane issues� This is the case particularly with financial 
decision-making� The norm throughout the region is that most capability 
providers—chiefs or commanders of services—do not possess their own 
operations and maintenance budgets� As a result, collective training and 
overall readiness remain underdeveloped by Western standards�
3� This centralized decision-making continues to dissuade leaders’ critical 
thinking� One observable consequence of this practice is that staff work is 
of low quality, voluminous, and turgid, and it rarely provides leaders with 
the information necessary to make informed decisions�
4� In place of critical thinking, one finds an organizational instinct to rely 
on the legacy of using the algorithmic approach to problem solving� 
Quantification of what are subjective issues, such as day-to-day planning 
and management, allows leaders to avoid individual responsibility 
because the algorithm is always correct—after all, it is “scientific�”
5� Defense planning at the national level throughout the region (including 
by the defense institutions of even such relatively advanced cases as 
Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and the Baltic States) is underdeveloped at 
best and a failure at worst� The region is awash with long-term defense 
plans that are unrealistic, financially unassessed, and therefore not 
feasible�16
6� Legacy platforms, systems, and weaponry do not include the Western 
concept of force management as part of the design process, which further 
weakens defense planning� The result is that force development as a 
concept—which must be inexorably tied to force management—remains 
underdeveloped throughout these armed forces�
7� Lastly, in this summary of remaining antithetical concepts, in central 
and eastern Europe there is an odd absence of either a conceptual 
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understanding of or linguistic cognate for capability. In some Slavic 
languages this is defined as potential, which misses the fundamental 
meaning of such a key concept of modern Western military planning 
and operations� Thus, the concept that a platform is not an asset unless 
its crew is fully trained, exercised, and provisioned is being recognized 
only slowly� The lack of understanding of this key concept throughout 
these defense institutions partly explains why commanders do not have 
operations and maintenance budgets, and therefore cannot reliably 
produce capabilities�
This summary of prevailing legacy concepts should give pause to Western 
officials who have the task of cooperating with these defense institutions and 
navies to introduce them to Western naval concepts� If Western officials fail to 
assist small navies in changing their individual and collective conceptual “souls,” 
those services will remain inhibited from integrating effectively into allied mili-
tary structures� As will be demonstrated clearly, the sale or gift of platforms and 
systems alone has not enabled these navies to adopt modern Western naval con-
cepts, and arguably it cannot in the future�
NATO’S NEW NAVIES: CHALLENGES AND STATUSES
If divesting themselves of communist legacy defense and naval concepts were not 
sufficiently difficult for NATO’s new navies, their leaderships face an additional 
challenge: because they are all continental states, their governments universally 
suffer from acute sea blindness�17 This all-but-universal continental focus, in 
which armies predominate, can be observed in the continued practice of orga-
nizing the armed forces under general staffs, as opposed to transitioning them to 
joint defense staff organizations� Indeed, it is not unusual to find only a few naval 
liaison officers posted to these general staffs, rather than a staff manned from all 
three services� Sea blindness is exacerbated further at the national level because 
few ministries of defense possess institutional knowledge of naval affairs or un-
derstand the requirements for survival in the modern maritime battle space� Not 
surprisingly, naval policy, or endorsed national concepts, hardly exists in either 
written or publicly published form, let alone within the institutional cognizance 
of defense institutions�
Further complicating naval planning is the stark reality that many of these 
ministries of defense lack a methodology for financially assessing even generic 
capability options�18 As a result, naval modernization plans do not receive ad-
equate attention and therefore suffer financially� Modernization plans cannot be 
developed properly, since in almost all these navies naval and fleet headquarters 
are effectively one and the same� The net result can be found in the poor quality 
or complete lack of staff work to support national defense planning� Similarly 
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to their respective ministries of defense and general staffs, these navies do not 
develop accurate costings to support force-development plans and they fail to 
formulate priorities, which results in capability incoherence that is easily observ-
able in many of these fleets (e�g�, platforms absent weapon systems and modern 
sensors)�
Additional evidence of the centralization of decision-making in capitals is 
that few commanders of navies are entrusted with operations and maintenance 
budgets to enable them to train and exercise their fleets in any predictable and 
rational fashion� Or, as in the case of the Latvian navy, the navy commander has 
a budget but lacks authority over maintenance� Therefore, the commander is 
forced to coordinate maintenance efforts with the ministry of defense, which is 
time-consuming and results in lower readiness of the fleet� The net result of these 
conditions has been ships and crews at sea for far fewer days than their older 
NATO navy counterparts—which reinforces the Soviet concept that it is better to 
be ready to go to sea rather than the prevailing Western norm of habitually being 
at sea�19 In addition to limiting the navies’ ability to train crews, these practices 
also preclude them from conducting the normal operations at sea that would 
provide greater opportunities for closer cooperation with more-sophisticated 
navies as a matter of course�
In comparison with new NATO armies, and perhaps even air forces, these 
navies also have suffered from an unintended externality: they generally have 
missed out on the assistance that the other services received during their deploy-
ments to Afghanistan and Iraq� Thus, there is an unintended imbalance created 
by how much attention and operational experience armies, particularly special 
operations forces, have gained as opposed to their generally ignored navies� 
Consequently, many officers and sailors missed out on the invaluable experience 
of deploying and maintaining ships for long periods on distant multinational 
operations�
This lack of hard operational experience particularly has prevented the de-
velopment of senior naval leaders who have a deeper understanding of Western 
naval concepts� This has been mitigated in part by the deployment of ships to 
NATO standing maritime forces and participation in some operations nearer 
to home (e�g�, Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, the United Nations maritime 
task force off the coast of Lebanon, and support for NATO air operations off 
Libya)� The centralization of resource management within ministries of defense 
has starved these navies of the funding necessary for adequate sea time, thereby 
further limiting habitual contacts with allied navies� This has stunted their in-
stitutional understanding of how they fit into larger allied formations and the 
associated exercise and training planning� This is costly to the Western alliance, 
because these navies’ self-limitation from intensive sea training means Western 
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navies miss the opportunity to profit from their regional knowledge and techni-
cal expertise in fields such as mine countermeasures (MCM)�
The assessment of these navies by region that follows will facilitate a deeper 
understanding of the unique challenges they face�
Baltic Sea
All navies operating in the Baltic Sea face considerable physical challenges� The 
sea is shallow (two hundred feet on average, which has earned it the nickname 
in German of the “flooded meadows”), registers low salinity and visibility, and 
experiences wide temperature variations�20 It is also quite busy, with some 2,500 
ships under way at any one time�21 These factors combine to produce a compli-
cated hydroacoustic environment for antisubmarine warfare (ASW)� The Baltic 
Sea also has the unique distinction of being home to between forty and fifty thou-
sand sea mines still unaccounted for from the two world wars�22 From a Western 
perspective, the Russian-controlled Kaliningrad Oblast located between Poland 
and Lithuania has become highly militarized� It contains the S-400 surface-to-
air missile (SAM) system and surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs)� According to 
some sources, from this oblast Russia is capable of carrying out an antiaccess/
area-denial campaign in a conflict with NATO�23 Kacprzyk and Friis recommend 
that, in light of these capabilities, in most scenarios between Russia and NATO 
the Baltic and Nordic regions should be considered a common operational area, 
given the likelihood of conflict escalation beyond either region�24
Poland. NATO’s new navies in the Baltic share a few similarities, but overall are 
quite different� The missions of the Baltic States’ navies are focused primarily on 
MCM, and to a lesser degree patrolling, while the Polish navy is in a class by itself� 
On paper, to support its stated mission of defending territorial waters and the 
country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the Polish navy appears fairly modest 
in terms of hulls compared with old NATO navies� It consists of two former USN 
FFG-7 frigates, three operational (albeit aged) ex-Norwegian Type 207 subma-
rines, one Kilo-class submarine, and many legacy warships and support ships� It 
is in the process of commissioning a newly built offshore patrol vessel (MAKO 
A100 class); it possesses SSMs, Link 11 on some of its vessels, and Link 16 secure 
datalink systems at its maritime operations center (MOC) and maritime com-
ponent command in Gdynia; and it plans to procure Link 16 for new maritime 
platforms and helicopters�25 On closer examination, the Polish navy shares many 
of the same weaknesses that plague all other navies addressed in this article, ex-
cept that it has a larger fleet� Fundamentally, the government in Warsaw largely 
has ignored the Polish navy, a situation the navy has not helped by keeping the 
naval fleet headquarters in Gdynia, as opposed to the capital, where decisions 
(particularly financial ones) are made� Poland’s FFG-7s are almost forty years old, 
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have deployed on only three occasions, and have never been modernized prop-
erly; efforts to build new warships in government-owned shipyards have been 
plagued by long delays and cost overruns�26 A misguided 2013 reorganization of 
the armed forces that closed service headquarters and replaced them with inspec-
torates undermined effective force management of the fleet and made modern-
ization and operational planning even more challenging�27 A recent government 
defense concept aims to reverse this decision and reestablish a fleet headquarters, 
but it remains to be seen whether the redesigned commander of the navy will 
possess an operations and maintenance budget�28
In terms of weapon systems, the Polish navy currently possesses and 
fields a number of types of SSM and SAM systems, such as the Norwegian- 
manufactured Naval Strike Missile, RBS-15 Mk 2, and Harpoon SSMs, as well as 
RIM-67 Standard systems� The navy has two missile unit squadrons armed with 
Naval Strike Missiles supported by Link 11 and Link 16, based in Siemirowice� 
That said, a senior Polish defense official admitted in 2016 that the missiles’ range 
(two hundred kilometers) exceeds that of the current network of coastal radars, 
which raises questions regarding the missiles’ general effectiveness, given that they 
are new and digital�29 This point apropos a recognized maritime picture (RMP) 
speaks to a problem common to all new navies: the lack of effective interministerial 
cooperation—between government ministries� In Poland, the government has 
yet to create an interministerial maritime operations center (IMOC) where one 
national RMP can be produced and effective coordination can be done at the 
expert level� The border guards’ radar picture currently does not feed into the 
navy’s MOC in Gdynia, providing further evidence of the poor state of coordina-
tion� Finally, although they are of questionable use, the navy possesses a legacy 
network of underwater sensors in the Gulf of Gdańsk�30
Poland’s current government has pledged to modernize the navy by spending 
over four billion dollars by 2030�31 Yet without significant changes to the concep-
tual framework by which the navy is commanded and its finances are managed, 
this ambitious modernization plan could fall short of reaching its full operational 
potential�
The Baltic Navies. The Baltic States’ navies, although small and largely centered 
on fulfilling MCM missions, are still sufficiently different to warrant a degree 
of individual treatment� Estonia falls short in relation to other countries in the 
region because it has conflicting jurisdictional authorities between the ministry 
of defense and civilian law-enforcement agencies�32 As a result, development of 
one of the most basic capabilities needed to effect maritime security—an RMP 
to produce maritime situational awareness (MSA)—has been stalled for years 
by bureaucratic disagreements over ministries’ respective institutional roles and 
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missions� This infighting has inhibited the creation of what should be thought 
of as a national asset� The current, outdated RMP was developed for peacetime 
conditions and is controlled by the Police and Border Guard Board (PBGB)� The 
problem with entrusting such a responsibility to a civilian ministry is identified 
in an insightful study on Estonia’s maritime security requirements chaired by an 
eminent Estonian expert in defense planning: “As a matter of agency policy, the 
PBGB capabilities have been optimized for the lowest level of crisis escalation—
the level of nonkinetic reactions, and therefore there is a systemic gap between its 
expected performance and the capabilities and performance required on higher 
levels of crisis escalation�”33
The current system cannot cover the waters that fall under Estonia’s jurisdic-
tion (both territorial waters and the EEZ) at all times, and the existing data- 
communications link to the 
naval headquarters is unsuit-
able� Moreover, the PBGB’s 
three rotary-wing aircraft 
are insufficient for the size 
of the country and are not 
configured to conduct naval 
operations� Owing to the lack of a wartime-capable RMP to support targeting, 
the report concludes that it is not possible to conduct the maritime defense of the 
country or employ its current fleet of three MCM vessels effectively�34 Finally, that 
such a study had to be commissioned, as opposed to being produced organically 
as routine staff work, speaks to the mistake made in the 2014 reorganization of 
the Estonian Defense Forces that closed the naval headquarters at Miinisadam, 
thereby undermining the navy’s ability to operate in a modern maritime defense 
environment�35
In keeping with many other legacy navies, the Estonian naval commander 
also does not possess a budget� Despite the government’s decision to limit the 
navy to conducting MCM missions and providing support to international op-
erations, there are some discussions about expanding some of its capabilities� 
Expansion efforts (e�g�, procuring Link 11) could improve communications and 
data exchange, or use the army’s existing FGM-148 Javelins in the coastal-defense 
mission, although their modest range (2,500 to 4,700 meters, depending on the 
variant) should be assessed as a limitation�36
The other two Baltic navies, those of Latvia and Lithuania, possess both MCM 
vessels and purpose-built patrol craft�37 They are fortunate in that—as is the case 
with Finland, Denmark, and Norway—their national maritime-surveillance 
infrastructure falls under their respective defense institutions�38 Thus, each 
possesses an RMP in which the navy plays the leading role� Latvia’s coast guard 
[A] clearer appreciation of the conceptual and 
institutional challenges faced by these [new] 
navies, as well as instances where they have 
been able to overcome them, is applicable 
within central and eastern Europe and beyond.
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falls under the navy, but inexplicably it purchased four Skrunda-class patrol 
vessels that carry only light machine guns, although they do have mission-
modular weapons potential� The Lithuanian navy possesses four ex–Danish navy 
Flyvefisken-class patrol vessels, two of which possess variable-depth sonars that 
enable them to conduct some ASW training� These are the most capable warships 
in the Baltic States, as they possess modern combat-management systems and are 
armed with 76 mm guns� Further, consideration is being given to fitting them 
with ASW mortars or depth charges from regional sources to complement their 
sonars�39 In principle, both navies also have dedicated minelaying capabilities 
using ex-Norwegian Vidar-class minelayers, but whether they have mines in suf-
ficient numbers and can execute fast minelaying tasks is unknown� Missing from 
these navies are critical enablers and weapons: missiles, torpedoes, and Link 11 or 
Link 16 (although the Lithuanian navy is investigating procurement of the latter)�
Most disturbing is a seeming inability of these three Baltic States’ governments 
to agree on something as simple and important as developing a common regional 
RMP, and each apparently is on its way to developing its own unique intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities�40 The fact that these countries 
cannot yet exchange real-time radar or sensor data with Allied Maritime Com-
mand (MARCOM), let alone among themselves, needs to be addressed at the 
appropriate political level�
Potential in the Baltic. In light of this brief analysis of the new allied navies in 
the Baltic, one could conclude that in their current configuration they bring few 
useful lethal assets to the alliance; however, they possess well-developed, modern 
ports (e�g�, Gdańsk, Gdynia, Klaipeda, and Liepaja)� The Polish navy has great 
potential for modernization and has the critical mass (and successive govern-
ments’ commitment to spend money on defense) to develop a modest but bal-
anced fleet that could make a significant contribution to NATO’s defense posture 
of the region� Yet notwithstanding Poland’s ambitious modernization plans, it 
is clear that the navy’s intellectual software needs to be thoroughly rebooted to 
retire legacy concepts, assumptions, and institutional logic and replace them with 
the Western approach to modern naval warfare� A justifiable fear is that even if 
new Western kit is procured it will remain underused or, worse, unused, and con-
strained by legacy concepts similar to the embarrassing example of the Polish air 
force F-16s that took almost ten years to be declared full operation capable�41 The 
other navies of the Baltic States face different challenges, and they are confronted 
with the problem of scale and financial penury� That said, given their geographic 
proximity to Russia and maritime exposure, there is an urgent need to improve 
their maritime-defense capabilities� As one Estonian naval officer averred in a 
private discussion, while there is no question that the country’s navy is part of the 
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NATO integrated command structure, the service does not feel it is a part of the 
alliance’s force structure�42
Black Sea
Russia’s military presence in the Black Sea was already significant before its sei-
zure of Crimea, but its occupation of and movement of key offensive assets to 
Crimean military facilities further complicate NATO naval defense planning�43 
One source argues that the deployment of antiship missile systems in Crimea 
and on the coast of Krasnodar Krai enables the Russian armed forces to strike 
surface targets on approximately one-third of the Black Sea�44 As Horrell argues, 
well before Russia’s invasion of Crimea its 2020 state armaments program envis-
aged significant upgrades to the Russian Black Sea Fleet, to include six upgraded 
Kilo-class submarines and six Admiral Grigorivich–class frigates� Allied naval 
planners also must account for the operational limitations placed on the deploy-
ment of warships from outside the Black Sea, as stipulated by the 1936 Montreux 
Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits�45
The Romanian and Bulgarian navies currently do not possess operational sub-
marines, and both lack sufficient numbers of ASW maritime-patrol aircraft� The 
situation is complicated further by the physical conditions of the Black Sea that 
make conducting ASW challenging�46 Black Sea allies also face the reality that co-
operation among themselves is meager at best� Bugajski and Doran paint a grim 
political-military picture of the region from the perspective of Western interests: 
“Currently, there is little regional integration and infrequent interaction among 
NATO’s Black Sea states, and an absence of well-defined contingency plans in 
case of a Russian military assault� Romania and Bulgaria conduct no bilateral na-
val exercises, possess no common surveillance or early warning capabilities, and 
have no collective defense plan�”47 Finally, allied naval and defense planners must 
factor in the unpredictability of Turkey’s position relative to Russian military ac-
tions under the current Justice and Development Party government�
Romania. Of the two new NATO navies in the Black Sea, the Romanian navy 
has made some progress in redevelopment since the end of the Cold War� As 
in all legacy navies under discussion, Soviet concepts and assumptions framed 
its institutional thinking about how its ships would fight and the essential naval 
engineering of Romania’s sizable fleet of ships� It has taken a number of years 
for leadership to emerge that is not highly influenced by Soviet-imported legacy 
concepts� Under communism, officers and sailors were narrowly trained and spe-
cialized, and the Western style of command was eschewed� There is no question 
that Sanders is right to observe that restructuring and adopting Western concepts 
and thinking were delayed in Romania by some ten years owing to successive 
governments’ indifference (sea blindness) and the limited financial resources 
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dedicated to the navy�48 Over the past two decades, intensive use of Western pro-
fessional military education and the procurement of Western warships (two ex–
Royal Navy Type 22 frigates in 2004) have combined to push the organization 
toward modernization and a growing conformance to Western concepts� How-
ever, the continued existence in the fleet of Soviet and indigenous Cold War– 
designed warships, all of which are of limited use in modern naval warfare (its river- 
monitor flotilla being a case in point), suggests a conceptually confused force� For 
example, logistics remain more tied to legacy than to Western concepts, which 
can only impede the readiness and effectiveness of the fleet�
While the procurement of two Type 22 frigates from Great Britain was seen 
as a significant commitment by the Romanian government to modernizing the 
navy, absent from the sale was 
the procurement of Western 
SSMs and SAMs, active ship-
defense systems, and modern 
electronic-warfare systems�49 
Recent efforts to procure 
these capabilities faltered in 2017 because of insufficient funds�50 Consequently, 
these ostensibly modern Western ships cannot be employed throughout the 
Black Sea� Nevertheless, whereas the ships hardly can be thought of as having 
reached full operational capability, they have had a positive effect on the Western-
ization of the navy� Delegation of command has been implemented, albeit slowly, 
and ship staffs (which enabled collective decision-making) have been disbanded�
Acquisition of these more-modern ships has required an overhaul of the 
professional military education and training system, which includes conducting 
principal warfare officer / tactical action officer training in-country, and, since 
2008, implementing NATO’s Guidance for Operational Planning (subsequently 
replaced by the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive)�51 That said, the 
lack of decentralized decision-making continues to pose a challenge� At the high-
est levels, it is troubling that many organizations of the navy possess their own 
budgets (e�g�, logistics, facilities, reconnaissance, and surveillance), but the fleet 
commander does not� It is almost as if there is a belief that these other activities 
are ongoing and therefore must be funded, but the fighting element of the service 
is expendable� Rather, the Romanian defense institution employs the practice 
common in the region (which is the result of legacy assumptions) of funding 
only a major operation, rather than recognizing the essential need for a naval 
commander to own an operations and maintenance budget if he is to achieve 
any reasonable degree of readiness� Because of this, the Type 22s are chronically 
underfunded and can meet only half of their annual required days at sea�
The small-navy model provides the greatest 
explanatory power for assessing the forces and 
policies of the navies in the Baltic, Black, and 
Adriatic Seas.
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In 2016, the Romanian government announced an ambitious moderniza-
tion program to modernize the Type 22 frigates. This is commendable—except 
for the fact that the ships are dated and the envisaged modernization budget is 
unlikely to cover all the necessary repairs and upgrades, to include weapons.52 
The existing Tetal corvettes are to be retired and, if funded, four modern, mul-
tirole Sigma-class corvettes will be built in-country.53 The navy has Link 11 and 
is expected to procure Link 16, as well as satellite communications. And while 
the navy lacks modern fixed submarine sensors, it claims to have surface and 
maritime air pictures.
The modernization plans are indeed ambitious, and bringing them to fruition 
is essential for the navy to overcome what one Romanian expert claims is a key 
limitation: the navy currently can undertake only surveillance and constabulary 
missions in the Black Sea, as well as support for international operations.54 De-
claring 2018 to be year of the navy, the minister for national defense announced 
the ambitious plan to procure three submarines and four surface warships for 
delivery to the fleet between 2018 and 2024, which would improve its current 
capabilities greatly.55 As an optimistic observation, the Romanian navy intelli-
gently moved its naval headquarters to Bucharest in 2003 to be close to the locus 
of defense budget and political decision-making. This sage move to the capital 
has yet to be followed by any other European postcommunist navy.
Bulgaria. The Bulgarian navy, like other communist navies, emerged from the 
Cold War oversize and in search of missions. While other countries underwent 
periodic efforts to modernize and embrace Western defense and military con-
cepts, domestic political disagreements in Bulgaria over the future of the military 
left the armed forces, and the navy in particular, bereft of guidance by which to 
reform themselves. A consequence of this strategy deficit was that well into the 
late 1990s the navy found itself too large in relation to its tasks and still dependent 
on legacy concepts; even today the navy possesses a large number of ex-Soviet 
warships and auxiliary vessels.
Modernization began late in 2005 when the navy took delivery of its first 
Wielingen-class ex-Belgian frigate, followed by a second in 2008, while a third 
was procured in 2009 to provide spare parts. This procurement from the Belgian 
Marine Component included a Tripartite mine hunter.56 On paper the frigates 
possess Western missiles (i.e., RIM-7 Sea Sparrow SAMs and MM-38 Exocet 
SSMs)—a rarity in these new navies. However, these weapons cannot be tested 
very often, because the ships spend limited time at sea—despite deploying an-
nually to Standing NATO Maritime Group 2, these ships get less than half the 
amount of time at sea that is considered the norm for ships of their class. More-
over, while the navy possesses Link 11, it does not have Link 16, which limits the 
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utility of its two Eurocopter AS 565 Panther helicopters (with a third to be pro-
cured in 2020)� The navy possesses a MOC in Varna; procured some new coastal-
surveillance radars in 2012; and is upgrading legacy analog systems, with U�S� as-
sistance� Bulgaria still lacks an IMOC, as well as feeds from civil ministries’ radars 
and sensors, thereby inhibiting a more comprehensive MSA� Bulgaria plans to 
procure capabilities for secure communications with MARCOM by 2020�
As is so often the case in postcommunist governments, legacy procurement 
concepts typically focus on platforms and ignore essential items such as training, 
consumables, and a budget process steered by commanders so as to create naval 
force capabilities�57 This has affected directly the ability of the navy to create and 
maintain a semblance of readiness� An example of the perilous state of the navy 
occurred in spring 2011 when the minister of defense directed the deployment of 
the high-readiness frigate to support allied operations off Libya� Because of the 
lack of funding within the navy, it took two weeks to deploy this single vessel�58
The inability of the ministry of defense to define its development plans finan-
cially has stalled planning throughout the armed forces�59 This lack of effective 
planning, combined with the international financial crisis, resulted in 2009 in the 
cancelation of naval modernization plans because the government was forced to 
abandon the procurement of four French Gowind-class corvettes� A plan to resur-
rect this needed procurement so that superannuated Soviet ships could be retired 
was canceled again in 2017�60 Current modernization plans envisage the procure-
ment of two corvettes�61 This assessment of the Bulgarian navy demonstrates that 
the fleet is aging and lacks sufficient funding priorities that would cover essential 
training� As Sanders observes, this situation is unlikely to improve in the medium 
term, given the past performance of the defense institution�62
A Tricky Balance. The existing balance of power in the Black Sea, therefore, is far 
from being in the West’s favor� Efforts to modernize the Romanian and Bulgarian 
fleets have fallen short of creating and maintaining necessary operational capa-
bilities to match the challenges that Russia’s military buildup poses�
In light of this assessment, it is difficult to accept Sanders’s view that following 
the Membership Action Plan leading to NATO accession “led to more focused, 
systematic and effective military reform in both states�”63 The fact that both na-
vies remain conceptually split between legacy and Western naval concepts speaks 
to the continued presence of residual influences� For example, it is problematic 
that the practice of keeping in service aged legacy platforms (e�g�, river flotilla 
vessels) can provide utility in modern naval warfare�
But it is the political dynamics in the region that are most challenging for 
the alliance� These dynamics include a politically unpredictable Turkey, as well 
as a Bulgarian policy that turned down the establishment of a NATO Black Sea 
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fleet—advocated by a former Romanian minister of defense—on the grounds that 
Bulgaria did not want to irritate Russia, to which many Bulgarians are favorably 
disposed�64 Thus, unfavorable geography, owing to Russia’s seizure of Crimea and 
political discord among NATO nations, leaves the Romanian navy exposed and 
in need of strong allied support and modernization� Without doubt, the alliance 
needs to continue the policy initiated after the Russian annexation of Crimea: 
enter the Black Sea more frequently and take advantage of deploying existing ad-
vanced capabilities conveniently not addressed under the terms of the Montreux 
Convention (e�g�, maritime patrol aircraft do not fall under the treaty)�65
Adriatic Sea
In comparison with the Black and Baltic Seas, the Adriatic Sea, strategically 
speaking, is all but a backwater� The littoral states are members of the alliance 
and maritime security priorities are dominated by navies and coast guards whose 
missions are limited to supporting civil authorities in border control, antismug-
gling, and other law-enforcement tasks� Not one of them possesses any variant of 
the Link tactical digital information system, nor do they have the active sonars 
that would enable them to undertake ASW operations� With the exception of Al-
bania, all other littoral navies have the former Yugoslavian navy’s (Jugoslavenska 
Ratna Mornarica, known as JRM from its Yugoslav abbreviation) legacy concepts 
and platforms of varying intensities�
Overall, the Adriatic is a benign maritime environment, but one that sees 
heavy traffic (some forty thousand vessels per year)� The countries on its east-
ern seaboard suffer from entrenched legacy civil institutions with conflicting 
responsibilities and authorities over maritime security� With the exception of the 
Croatian navy, limited defense budgets have produced only modest naval forces� 
Since the navies of Slovenia, Montenegro, and Albania exist primarily to render 
support to civil authorities, the following discussion addresses them together so 
as to provide an understanding of their common challenges, whereas, given the 
Croatian navy’s size and the scope of its government’s maritime ambition, it is 
addressed separately�
Slovenia, Montenegro, and Albania. It would be easy to dismiss the relevance of 
the navies of Slovenia, Montenegro, and Albania, given their small fleets, their 
limited numbers of hulls and limited capabilities, and the priority they give to 
supporting civil tasks� However, although these services are small and their capa-
bilities limited, strong arguments can be made that they can support missions to 
counter negative effects on political and social stability as well as to control illegal 
immigration�66 They have been structured to provide surveillance, patrolling, and 
interdiction missions on their limited budgets�
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The Slovenian armed forces’ ship Triglav 11 likely represents the most mod-
ern and capable vessel of the three navies�67 Montenegro has struggled to find a 
way to put ships to sea that are not too old or expensive to operate (e�g�, ex-JRM 
Kotor-class frigates) and has opted to repair two aged ex-JRM Končar-class mis-
sile boats�68 Largely because of limited resources, Albania placed the coast guard 
within the navy and embraced the concept of one navy with two missions, but 
proceeded to procure four Damen Stan Patrol 4207–class patrol boats, which 
were unarmed�69 The expla-
nation for the anomalous 
procurement is  that they 
were financed partially by 
the Netherlands Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, which meant 
the funds could not be used 
to purchase military items�70 
That being the case, arm-
ing the ships with 20 mm 
automated naval guns on the main decks has been delayed until the warranty 
expiration of the last ship—a period of almost ten years� But despite this limita-
tion, these boats have been deployed (unarmed) in support of Standing NATO 
Maritime Group 2 in the Aegean Sea�
In addition to procuring vessels that meet mission requirements yet are af-
fordable to operate, the other key challenge with which they have struggled is 
the creation of effective interministerial coordination arrangements within their 
respective governments� In this particular context, an effective arrangement is 
defined as one in which those agencies that possess the capabilities needed to 
carry out their respective roles and missions lead in those tasks� The depth of this 
challenge can be found in the difficulties involved in something as basic as creat-
ing and maintaining an RMP that meets the requirements of national defense and 
law enforcement� It was not until 2003 that the Slovenian government recognized 
the need for such a standing, coordinated, interministerial body that addressed 
both national and operation-level issues�71
Albania and Croatia adopted the Norwegian model of creating an IMOC on 
the basis of the functional division of responsibilities among ministries� Alba-
nian legislation, though, had the unintended consequence of placing the cost 
of the coast guard missions on the navy but also removing the service from the 
armed forces’ chain of command� Moreover, IMOCs, by themselves and with a 
standing MOC, cannot maintain secure communications with MARCOM and 
exchange classified data� The Montenegrin navy created a MOC and coordinated 
The continued employment of legacy forces is 
a key impediment to small navies’ adoption of 
Western naval concepts. Their entire approach 
to naval architecture, weapons, training, and 
even crew space is vastly different. . . .  
[C]ommunist and Western military and naval 
concepts are antithetical, and therefore inca-
pable of coexistence in the same institution.
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with civilian agencies through an interministerial working group� When re-
quired, representatives from civilian ministries augment MOC staff in the port 
of Bar� Effective interministerial coordination and the creation of an RMP have 
been essential for these navies to contribute effectively to the Italian-sponsored 
Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Center and produce a common virtual mari-
time awareness picture using information provided by member states and then 
shared with Allied Maritime Command in Naples, Italy�72
Croatia. Finally, the Croatian navy is the only postcommunist navy in the region 
with a fleet that is approaching being balanced� This is logical given Croatia’s al-
most two-thousand-kilometer coastline and its possession of over one thousand 
islands, inlets, and reefs� Unique among neighboring navies, the service also pos-
sesses some offensive capabilities (i�e�, missiles) and JRM-era mines�73 The navy is 
considering acquiring Link 11, and the fleet consists of a mixture of ex-JRM mis-
sile craft (of the Končar and Kralj classes), patrol boats (of the Mirna class), and 
two ex–Finnish navy Helsinki-class missile boats, which possess active sonars� 
Significantly, the navy fields the Swedish RBS-15 Mk 1 SSM system at sea and 
ashore, slated for replacement in 2024� The fleet includes one minesweeping ves-
sel and various logistic-support ships, and it has plans to procure MCM vessels� 
Additionally, the navy is defining the requirement for new offshore patrol vessels 
to enter the fleet around 2024� A key operational limitation for the Croatian navy 
is that despite the country’s extensive coastline and territorial seas, the navy lacks 
a dedicated firing range�
As in the other former Yugoslav republics, for Croatia the acquisition of an 
effective RMP has proved to be challenging, owing to overlaps in responsibilities 
among the Croatian navy and civil ministries and agencies� The navy’s MOC re-
ceives radar feeds from civilian ministries and agencies, but they are not integrat-
ed into a common picture; creating a national MOC with one RMP is needed�74 
Independently, it maintains an extensive coastal radar system, with nine radar 
sites, which include four AN/FPS-117 three-dimensional, nine GEM elettronica, 
and four Enhanced Peregrine radars, and other sensors� The AN/FPS-117 radars 
are suboptimal for surface surveillance and are slated to be replaced with two-
dimensional systems�
The Croatian navy’s obvious challenge is its lack of financial means� Note 
that the replacements for the RBS-15 SSMs and the offshore patrol vessel are to 
be acquired in the same period� Resource planning likely will be strained by the 
recent re-creation of the navy’s maritime infantry battalion, the need to replace 
the AN/FPS-117 radars, and the pending acquisition of MCM vessels� Croatia is 
unarguably a maritime nation, yet the navy receives, on average, only 6 percent 
of the defense budget� In light of these realities, it is clear that the government in 
Zagreb suffers from its own form of maritime myopia�
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Challenges Ahead. These navies are modest at best and face considerable inter-
nal, bureaucratic obstacles to creating nationally, let alone collectively, common 
RMPs� Moreover, notwithstanding the offensive capabilities of the Croatian navy, 
key capabilities such as ASW and even the ability to target (i�e�, via Link 11) are 
not currently in their inventories�
However, it would be a mistake to dismiss them� With Montenegro’s accession 
to the alliance in 2017, the Adriatic is now effectively a NATO lake� That being 
the case, modest levels of relevant Western advice and assistance programs, par-
ticularly focused on fixing political barriers to creating RMPs, are long overdue� 
In the end, the alliance should consider its policies a success if these regional 
navies are capable of undertaking peacetime surveillance, reconnaissance, and 
response tasks, thereby allowing the more capable Italian and Hellenic navies to 
carry out blue-water operations in support of Western objectives farther afield, 
augmented with these fleets’ specialized capabilities�
ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF WESTERN ADVICE  
AND ASSISTANCE POLICIES
A cursory review of NATO’s new navies demonstrates that they are burdened 
with old platforms, sensors, and weapons (or a lack of platforms, sensors, and 
weapons) and that they are bereft of adequate training concepts, funding, and in 
some cases experienced senior leadership that understands the need to be at sea 
rather than only preparing to go to sea� An explanation for the dismal state of 
capability and readiness of these navies can be found in the lack of policy atten-
tion their own national leaderships pay them� Thus, it should not be surprising 
that these navies long have lacked a strong operational focus and their readiness 
suffers accordingly�
A frustrating legacy concept that continues to be practiced among these gov-
ernments is that not all navy commanders are entrusted with operations and 
maintenance budgets� Therefore, readiness often is seen solely as a function of 
a discrete operation and is financed on an ad hoc basis, rather than being seen 
as the lifeblood of any navy� The result is that essential training is funded fully 
only when the navy is supporting an operation, such as participating in one of 
the alliance’s standing NATO maritime groups� Yet new navies have to use these 
deployments as opportunities for gaining needed sea days and developing basic 
skills, as opposed to using them to achieve world-class standards� The evidence 
suggests that few, if any, of these navies are able to put to sea annually for a num-
ber of days adequate to achieve levels of readiness and operational effectiveness 
comparable to those of old NATO navies�
It is past time to retire these legacy concepts in a coherent fashion� Yet blame 
for the state of underdevelopment of these navies needs to be shared�
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Twenty-five years of providing Western advice and assistance and their dismal 
return on investment should demonstrate to officials that shaking off communist 
legacy concepts is difficult� As Keynes presciently observed, “The difficulty lies 
not so much in developing new ideas as in escaping from old ones, which ramify, 
for those brought up as most of us have been, into every corner of our minds�”75 
The difficulty of changing concepts should prompt Western officials to question 
their policies and assumptions, as they have been ineffectual thus far in generat-
ing needed change in these 
navies� The long-standing 
Western assistance policy 
rests on the assumption that 
the challenges facing these 
navies are largely technical 
and can be addressed using 
focused training at the tactical 
level� Missing has been any official awareness that such approaches will only treat 
symptoms, not address causation in a coherent manner�76
As for the new navies’ governments, they must make the hard choices to cut 
ties to as many legacy concepts as possible� Communist military equipment 
was designed to support legacy-defined military doctrine, and it is problematic 
whether any of these aged legacy platforms and systems could produce lethality 
in the modern maritime battle space� Retiring legacy platforms, their systems, 
and accompanying concepts as soon as possible would free up needed funds for 
modernization and experimentation�
Officials need to recognize that taking the first step on the road to reform 
is inherently a political matter and therefore must be addressed as a political 
problem� This is an important point; acceptance of it leads to the conclusion that 
responsibility for reform cannot be entrusted to armed forces and ministries of 
defense alone, but rather must reside with the heads of government in all NATO 
nations’ capitals�
The need for political solutions can be seen in the struggle of the new Adriatic 
and Estonian navies to resolve jurisdictional disputes over institutional roles and 
missions to create RMPs� The inability of these navies to clarify institutional roles 
and missions with other ministries is not just an internal political issue but rather 
has serious consequences for wider Western interests� Bureaucratic discord has 
led to suboptimal capabilities that cannot produce an RMP that supports MSA, 
which in turn prevents the services in question from being able to respond ef-
fectively and quickly to events at sea�
In short, NATO and Western governments have been suffering from their own 
case of sea blindness when it comes to understanding the real challenges these 
If divesting themselves of communist legacy 
defense and naval concepts were not sufficiently 
difficult for NATO’s new navies, their leader-
ships face an additional challenge: because they 
are all continental states, their governments 
universally suffer from acute sea blindness.
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navies have faced� As a representative example, Hoffman makes the prescient 
observation that, with regard to the U�S� government’s European Reassurance 
Initiative, almost none of the eight hundred million dollars appropriated in fiscal 
year (FY) 2016 nor any part of a budget request in FY17 of $3�42 billion has been 
allocated to the U�S� Navy to support NATO’s new navies�77 This lack of attention 
by the Department of the Navy is surprising, given that one of its key strategy 
documents has cooperative strategy in its title and the Navy’s support of these 
activities is identified throughout the document�78
In light of the challenging security environment in the Baltic and Black Seas 
and given the state of underdevelopment of the alliance’s new navies, immediate 
action at the political level of the alliance and its member nations is long overdue� 
Previous Western assistance policies and programs have been ineffective� Equally, 
governments in central and eastern Europe have not supported consistently the 
need to modernize their navies� A refocus of efforts toward reform should be 
based on the principle, identified by Ullman, of fast-tracking experimentation 
in the Black Sea to develop new and innovative solutions for deterring Russian 
adventurism in either the Baltic or Black Sea�79 The challenges to this initiative 
are numerous, but they can be overcome with strong support and pressure from 
governments�
From the perspective of the new navies, the legacy concept—of focusing on 
maintaining platforms at all costs while deprecating the overwhelming impor-
tance in warfare of creating effects—needs to be fully retired and its Western 
counterpart implemented� As they experiment with new technologies, these 
navies need to focus on innovation, with the full support and cooperation of 
their allies�80 The alliance should focus on countering Russian offensive threats 
in the Baltic and Black Seas and should experiment with drones, new sensors 
and networks, ISR, cyber capabilities, nontraditional platforms, and targeting, 
all of which should take place across air, sea, and land domains� Whatever ca-
pabilities are developed need to be hardened against Russian aggressive use of 
the electromagnetic spectrum, and to the greatest extent possible tasks and costs 
should be rationalized across member states� In the case of the Baltic navies, old 
and relatively inexpensive solutions that could reinforce deterrence include ac-
quiring a reliable fast-mining capability and employing nontraditional delivery 
means�81 The Adriatic navies should not be left out of this effort; the fleets should 
be encouraged to use their technical expertise to support these initiatives, given 
that some of them (e�g�, sensors and cyber capabilities) could be relevant to the 
environment�
Maintaining the delicate balance among all these priorities—including, as 
noted, innovation, joint/combined experimentation, and increasing operations—
will pose a significant challenge to these navies and their allies� However, this is 
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where close political oversight by, if not continuous pressure from, alliance gov-
ernments is essential� Faced with a political mandate to undertake these priori-
ties, all these navies can find efficiencies to free up necessary funding� After all, 
while the proposal to refocus one of NATO’s two standing maritime groups onto 
high-end naval warfare has great merit, unless the alliance’s new navies become 
more operational and more capable of making national contributions they may 
end up as nothing more than missed opportunities�82
This article has marshaled extensive fieldwork and a deep review of the literature 
to argue that national governments and key long-standing NATO members have 
overlooked NATO’s new navies� Indeed, in most cases these navies have been 
more starved of capital redevelopment and operations and maintenance funding 
than their respective armies and air forces, in addition to receiving less and less-
effective Western advice and assistance� The old Viennese saying that “the situ-
ation is desperate but not serious” is not true—the situation is both serious and 
desperate—and this applies directly to the need for all NATO nations and navies 
to pay close attention to this issue�
The governments of the new navies must move in the short term to recon-
ceptualize the use and management of their navies� Perhaps controversially, this 
policy redefinition should precede a commitment of funds to recapitalize their 
navies so as to ensure that money is not wasted unwittingly supporting legacy 
concepts and platforms� With Russian provocations occurring frequently at sea, 
these governments must change their defense policies and priorities to improve 
their ability to contribute to their maritime security as soon as possible� The im-
portance of naval forces must be reassessed and reinforced to ensure that these 
navies can and do contribute to their countries’ maritime defense to the greatest 
degree possible� If for no other reason, failure to do so runs the risk of ending up 
completely outsourcing this key mission to allied navies, thereby opening gov-
ernments to the accusation of undermining continuity of national sovereignty�
In addition to the navies themselves, almost all of their headquarters are 
located on the coasts, and often distant, physically and mentally, from their 
capitals� Organizationally and institutionally, they have been relegated to being 
mere tactical appendages to the rest of their countries’ armed forces, thereby 
denying government officials a full appreciation of the reality of modern naval 
warfare and the imminence of Russian maritime threats� To improve oversight 
and management of these navies, their governments should insist that if naval 
headquarters are not located in capitals already they should move there as soon as 
possible� This would provide these governments with the necessary opportunities 
to reorganize army-dominant general staffs and create integrated defense head-
quarters� This would provide governments with better instruments of military 
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power, as well as enable naval staffs to compete more effectively for funding and 
political attention�
Both old and new NATO members need to respond urgently to the need to 
transform these navies� Whereas this article has argued that a restatement of 
priorities for governments in the region is needed, Western governments also 
need to perform such a review� Fundamentally, Western governments need to 
change their languid approach to their advice and assistance programs to pro-
vide improved aid to the new navies as they modernize and otherwise transform 
themselves� The necessary assessment of the capabilities of the new navies should 
leave no one in doubt that the previous approaches to providing advice and assis-
tance simply have not produced sufficient returns on investment� The comfort-
able approach—of defining reform as a technical challenge that can be addressed 
with training or by the piecemeal transfer or sale of platforms and systems—has 
created instead institutional, and therefore capability, incoherence� 
These navies are no longer legacy services, but neither are they fully Western� 
While the traditional advice and assistance policies and programs have their 
place, by themselves they cannot produce the necessary institutional change� 
New policies—starting from a tabula rasa—should focus primarily on how to 
help these navies retire legacy concepts and replace them with their Western 
counterparts, with the objective of helping them to meet their unique maritime-
security requirements� This review and replacement process requires that a broad 
policy framework be adopted across allied nations and their navies, one that 
drives experimentation within the maritime environment to produce cutting-
edge, even nontraditional, but predictable, lethality at sea� In the end, it is predict-
able lethality and a political willingness to use it to defend vital interests that pro-
duce what the alliance desperately needs in the Baltic and Black Seas: deterrence� 
Allied nations must not tarry; the West essentially has lost twenty-five years, and 
it is imprudent to assume that Russian policy will continue to be so generous as 
to ignore these Western vulnerabilities ad infinitum.
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